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Abstract
Corruption in the public sector is manifested both in collusive and noncollusive
forms. Collusive corruption erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion.
Noncollusive corruption stems from abuse of the public position by corrupt public
oﬃcials to extort bribes from the private agents, thus, reduces their income. Im-
portantly, in both types of interaction with the public sector the private agents are
bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes, as neither bribes
paid nor gains from tax evasion are deterministic. To analyze eﬀects of corruption
by accounting for the uncertainty caused by it, a stochastic dynamic growth model
is considered. The model also incorporates possibility of nonlinear impact of corrup-
tion on production, which implies that corruption deteriorates the growth potential
by preventing producers to enter high productive sectors. Most importantly, it is
demonstrated that the rise of corruption, by increasing uncertainty, exerts adverse
eﬀects on capital accumulation, thus leads to lower growth rates. Hence, this pa-
per resolves the theoretical ambiguity with regards to the overall growth eﬀect of
corruption obtained in previous studies.
I thank Keith Blackburn, Been-Lon Chen, and Yew-Kwang Ng for the valuable comments on the
paper.
yDepartment of Economics, Monash University, e-mail: Ratbek.D@Buseco.monash.edu.au
1 Introduction
Corruption is deﬁned as a use of public position to create and capture private rents.
This opportunism of bureaucracy impacts the economy through various channels.1 This
paper investigates how corruption aﬀects growth by extending the existing models that
focused on income redistribution and public sector ineﬃciencies in two aspects. Namely,
the model used in the paper allows for a nonlinear impact of corruption on ﬁrms depending
on their productivity, and takes into account income uncertainty caused by interactions
between corrupt bureaucracy and ﬁrms. Importantly, the paper shows that by accounting
for these eﬀects one can avoid the existing theoretical ambiguity about the overall eﬀect of
corruption on growth. Thus, the paper reconciles the theory with the empirical evidence
that ﬁnds the overall eﬀect of corruption on economic growth is unambiguously negative.
There is a large body of literature that presents the analysis of the economic impact
of corruption, which still appears controversial. The so called "the sand on the wheels"
literature recognizes that corruption has a substantial adverse eﬀect on economic growth
by creating a tremendous burden on the private sector.2 However, the literature dubbed
as "the grease on the wheel" suggests that corruption can be eﬃciency improving.3 In this
literature corruption is viewed as an optimal response to market distortions that lessens
the burden of regulations, and thus, improves eﬃciency. Due to these opposing impacts,
1See Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Bardhan (1997), Aidt (2003), Alam (1989) for details.
2For example see: Barelli and Pessoa (2002); Mauro (2004); Rivera-Baitiz (2002); Rose-Ackerman
(2004), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Aidt (2003), Ali and Isse (2003), Tanzi (2000), Tanzi et al. (2000),
Bardhan (1997), Knack and Keefer (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), Alam (1989), Abed and Gupta
(2002).
3For example, Leﬀ (1964) suggests that corruption that decreases red tape can be beneﬁcial for
economic growth. Similar views are shared by Huntington (1968) and Liu (1985, 1996). Analyzing
enforcement of property rights by corrupt bureaucrats Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), and analyzing the
oﬃcials’ actions that involve the exercise of discretion and cannot be monitored perfectly, Klitgaard (1988)
have shown theoretically the possibility of the positive output-maximizing level of corruption. Dreher and
Gassebner (2007), Meon and Weill (2006) empirically show corruption can be eﬃciency-enhancing. In
line with this reasoning, interestingly, Sepulveda and Mendez (2006) ﬁnd that the growth-maximizing
level of corruption is, in fact, positive.
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it appears that overall eﬀects of corruption on economic growth are ambiguous. For
example, the results obtained by Mauro (1995) and Barreto (2000) show that the eﬀect
of corruption on growth is not straightforward as it may have both eﬃciency improving
and deteriorating characteristics simultaneously.
Unlike the theory, the empirical studies ﬁnd that corruption is always bad for growth
(Mauro, 1995; Meon and Weill, 2006; Mo, 2001; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). One
reason for the theoretical ambiguity of the overall economic eﬀects of corruption, not
shared by the empirical studies, might be that not all impacts of corruption are accounted
for in the analysis. Along these lines, this paper maintains that the uncertainty created by
corruption and the nonlinear impact of corruption on ﬁrms depending on their productivity
are the important factors that help explain better the relationship between corruption and
growth. To accomplish this task the paper synthesizes the ideas developed in the literature
that discussed below.
To this end, the possibility of nonlinear eﬀect of corruption has been revealed by several
empirical studies. For example, Coppier and Michetti (2006) argue that the relationship
between corruption and production have a nonlinear nature. Corroborating them, Barelli
and Pessoa (2002) and Svensson (2003) ﬁnd that corruption redistributes income to bu-
reaucrats through extraction of output from productive ﬁrms, thus, decreases net returns
to capital in productive sectors, as well as creates entry barriers. Broadman and Recana-
tini (1999), Djankov et al. (2002), and Svensson (2005) ﬁnd a strong correlation between
higher barriers to market entry and the level of corruption. Mocan (2004) and Svensson
(2003) demonstrate that the agents with high income levels pay also more bribes.
Surprisingly, the literature on corruption has largely neglected the growth impact of the
uncertainty created by corruption. However, that corruption and income volatility may be
related has been well noticed. For example, Denizer et al. (2000) state that corruption can
be an important factor contributing to income volatility. One reason for this relationship
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is that in the environment with corrupt bureaucracy, the allocation of government permits
and licenses is unpredictable. Consequently, the private ﬁrm‘s output depending on such
permits and licenses is also subject to uncertainty. Moreover, in the environment with
a highly corrupt and predatory bureaucracy, there is always a risk that a private agent
can be framed and extorted bribes by the public oﬃcials, which may be a stochastic
process itself. According to Polinsky and Shavell (2001), the extortion outcomes for the
private agents, depending on the regulation and enforcement structure and attitudes to
risk, may vary quite signiﬁcantly. In addition, this income volatility might be burdensome,
too: the idea that the secrecy stemming out of the illegal nature of corruption imposes
an additional burden on the economy has been indicated by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
Campos (2001) argues that predictability of corruption is important and plays signiﬁcant
role in determining its growth impact.
To ﬁll this gap in the literature, this paper formally incorporates the uncertainty stem-
ming from interactions with corrupt bureaucracy and its nonlinear eﬀect on production
into a neoclassical growth model. It is done by extending the models used in the liter-
ature that maintains that corruption strongly aﬀects economic growth by decreasing the
productive input provided by the public sector and imposing a burden on the ﬁrms by
extorting bribes4. Importantly, in the model, there is no ad hoc assumption that cor-
ruption a priori adversely or beneﬁcially impacts economy. Instead, the model allows for
both "the sand on the wheel" and "the grease on the wheel" eﬀects of corruption. In
such an environment, the agents’ disposable income depends on the random outcomes of
various interactions with the bureaucrats,5 and indirectly depends on the productive input
provided by the public sector.
4For example, Blackburn et al. (2005), Keefer and Knack (2002), Del Monte and Papagni (2001),
Barreto (2000) ﬁnd that the corrupt rent-seeking misallocates public resources from productive use,
hence, decrease capital productivity in the economy.
5Lin and Yang (2001) used a similar approach to analyze tax evasion.
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The main results of the paper are as follows. To reﬂect the empirical ﬁndings that
corrupt bureaucracy extort more income from highly proﬁtable ﬁrms6, it is assumed that
in the model economy there two sectors: low and high-productivity. Corruption creates
entry barriers into the high-productive sector both through extortion of bribes and the
associated increase in income uncertainty. The marginal product of capital used in the
high-productive sector depends on the infrastructure and services provided by the pub-
lic sector. Since, corruption reduces the public productive input through increased tax
evasion and ineﬃciency of the government, with an increase in corruption, returns on
investment in the high-productive sector are decreased. This outcome further reduces
capital accumulation in the high-productive sector and hinders overall economic growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows: ﬁrst, the setup of the basic model is described,
then the implications based on the optimal solution obtained are analyzed.
2 The Model
2.1 Background
The literature classiﬁes corruption as ex ante or noncollusive and ex post or collusive.
In provision of public services that requires red tape we have noncollusive corruption. In
this case, corrupt bureaucracy bundles the public services with excessive red tape or the
private agents are framed directly. This corrupt behavior coerces private agents to pay
bribes to the bureaucrat involved. The extent of such extortion depends on the strength
of the rule of law and the judicial system in the economy. This type of corruption leads to
bottlenecks (long queues) and shortages of public goods and services.7 Thus, only those
who ﬁnd it beneﬁcial pay bribes and obtain the service eﬀectively at a higher price. For
6See Mocan (2004), Svensson (2003).
7See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, (1993).
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example, Svensson (2003) ﬁnds that the ﬁrms with higher proﬁts also pay more bribes.
Mocan (2004) also ﬁnds that individuals with higher income and education levels are more
likely to be asked for bribes. Hunt (2004) examines how bribes are paid using data from
34 countries, and also ﬁnds that rich people pay the most bribes while the poor the least.
Thus, the impact of corruption on ﬁrms is nonlinear, as while extorting bribes bureaucrats
discriminate low productivity agents from high productivity ones.
Collusive corruption happens only after an interaction between the private and public
agents occurred. It usually involves the situation when the public agent obtains some
information about the private agent’s failure in abiding by law or regulation. Consequently,
to avoid the penalty for the infringement the private agent is willing to pay bribes to the
public agent. A corrupt public agent chooses bribes and conceals the infringement. Thus,
a corrupt deal occurs only if it is beneﬁcial for both public and private agents. This
situation may arise in relation with costly compliance to regulations, such as taxation.8
In both types of corrupt deals the outcomes are random as depends on the private
bargaining between the public and private agents, and hence, not known to the private
agent beforehand.9 Therefore, after accounting for both types of corruption stemming
from public sector activites, and the income uncertainty caused by them, we summarize
that corruption is manifested as: i) corrupt tax inspectors concealing tax evasion for the
bribes paid by detected tax evaders; ii) corrupt public oﬃcials abusing the authority given
to them by attaching excessive red tape to the public services to coerce the private agents
to pay bribes; iii) income uncertainty, because in both types of corruption, the outcome
for the private agent is random; iv) high-productive ﬁrms paying more bribes. Now, given
8See Yitzhaki (1974), Lin and Yang (2001), Chen (2003) more on tax evasion.
9Some may argue that corruption actually decreases uncertainty as the ﬁrms by paying bribes get the
service they want right away and do not have to wait in unawareness. The problem with this reasoning is
that corrupt deals are not openly conducted and there is no public price list available for the ﬁrms to use
in their planning. Even if the bribe rates were a common knowledge, it is an illegal transaction, hence,
the secrecy (mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) makes the outcomes or bargaining uncertain for
the private agents.
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these main features of corruption, I proceed to the discussion of the environment where
corruption occurs.
2.2 The Environment
Let us consider a closed economy with ex-ante identical inﬁnitely-lived agents with zero
population growth. Each agent has a measure of utility deﬁned by a function on private
consumption c. The instantaneous utility function is given by
u(c) = ln(c): (1)
Assume that the agents maximize their expected utility
U(0) = E0
Z 1
0
ln(c(t)) exp( t)dt

; (2)
where  is the constant rate of time preference. Further, when it does not distort the
underlying idea we omit the time argument.
Assume that there are two types of production technology: low-productivity and high-
productivity. In the low-productivity case the production function is given as:
y1 = Ak1; (3)
where, A is the technology coeﬃcient assumed to be exogenous. In case of high-
productivity technology, the production function has the following form:
y2 = B(g)k2: (4)
Here y1 and y2 are output per capita, k1 and k2 is per worker capital, g is per worker
7
public input, which leads to a higher productivity in the second sector: B(g) > A.10 It
is also assumed that the production functions are stationary within the planning horizon.
The government imposes an income tax at a ﬂat rate  and uses the revenues to produce
productive government services, g. In general, I model with this tax all direct costs
caused by the government regulations. Therefore, tax evasion in this model captures
general non-compliance to costly regulations. To capture the ineﬃciency in the public
sector, the public input can be expressed as:
g = y;
where 0 <   1 is the eﬃciency coeﬃcient. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that due to
corruption (institutional weakness in general) the amount and quality of public services
fall.11
It is assumed that both types of corruption occurs in this economy. Collusive corruption
takes place when the bureaucrats and taxpayers collude to conceal the fact of tax evasion.
Non-collusive corruption occurs when the private agents wish to enter the high-productivity
sector, which enables them to obtain public services and infrastructure, but also makes
them a subject to extortion by the predatory bureaucrats. Optimizing agent may not put
all her capital stock into high productive production but rather divide the capital into
two parts and engage in production in both sectors. Assume, that k1 = (1   n)k is
the capital employed in the low-productive sector, while k2 = nk is the capital used in
the high-productive sector, where 0 < n < 1 is the share of capital stock used in the
high-productivity sector.
10Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993), Turnovsky (1996), Tsoukis and Miller (2003), and Chen (2006)
show importance of the public sector in economic growth. Although, the model in this paper does not
explicitly capture how the public input aﬀects productivity.
11As in Del Monte and Papagni (2001), and Blackburn et al. (2005)
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2.3 Collusive corruption
To increase their disposable income the agents evade taxes by under-reporting their true
income. We assume that the agent reports only (1   e)y of his total income y in per
capita terms. To combat tax evasion the government audits taxpayers randomly. The
joint probability of being audited and detected is given exogenously by p. The detected
evader pays back the due tax liability and some additional ﬁne. This penalty is determined
by a penalty rate  = 1 + s, which includes the tax evaded and a surcharge, s.
An individual taxpayer treats the tax rate, tax audit probability, and penalty rate as
given. We assume that a tax inspector can be corruptible with probability p1. The extent of
corruptibility depends on the quality of the institutions or speciﬁcally on their eﬀectiveness
in controlling corruption. Assuming that corruption exists implies the probability of the
tax inspector being corrupt satisﬁes 0 < p1 < 1. Thus we ignore the trivial p1 = 0 case.
Due to corruption the penalty rate becomes random, as when audited and detected a
taxpayer may pay bribes instead of the tax penalty. In other words, the eﬀective penalty
rate should be adjusted to the following:
1 =
8><>:  with probability q1 = 1  p1;b with probability p1; (5)
where b <  is the bribe rate, so tax evasion costs the bribe paid instead of the penalty,
if the inspector is corrupt.
In general the bribe rate depends on the bargaining power of the involved private
agents, which again depends on the institutional arrangements. The less the risk for the
tax inspector to be caught and punished the more bargaining power he wields.
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The expected value of the random penalty rate then is given by
E[1]   = p1b+ q1: (6)
Since 0 < p1 < 1, the expected penalty rate is lower than it is when the tax inspectors
are not corrupt.
Given the context, for an individual taxpayer being audited and getting a corrupt deal
is random. Thus, disposable income after taxes and audit is also a random variable given
by,
yd =
8><>: (1  )y + (1 
)ey;with probability p;
(1  )y + ey with probability 1  p:
(7)
Then the random return on a unit of evaded tax is determined as x1 = 1 with
probability (1  p), and x1 =  (  1) with probability p. The expected return on a unit
of evaded tax is given by x1 = 1   p. Tax evasion is possible only if x1 > 0, which
implies that p < 1. This condition is assumed to hold to allow for tax evasion in the
model.
It is known that this type of binomial process converges to some limiting normal
distribution with the mean equal to x1 and the variance of the return on tax evasion is
given by:12
21 = pq
2: (8)
Therefore, the random income generated through tax evasion is given by:
dx1 = xey + (1ey)dz1: (9)
12See Appendix A1 for derivation, and see Dixit (1993) for details.
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2.4 Noncollusive corruption
Private agents are subjected to noncollusive corruption, when they enter the high-productivity
sector. This essentially means extortion of bribes by bureaucrats from the private agent
involved in the high-productive sector through abuse of their power to license and audit.
The rationale here is that the high-productivity may mean organization of production at
urban centers with developed infrastructure, and frequently it also may mean a larger size
of the enterprises. All these make the producer easily detectable and create motivation for
government regulation and red tape. As we discussed earlier, corruption in public good
provision occurs through creation of red tape, which is used to extract rents from the
private agents.
This interaction is again can be viewed as a stochastic income shock to the private
agent. Since, the private agent involved in the high-productivity sector has to deal with
corrupt bureaucracy, we assume that the agent pays bribes with some probability. It is
clear that there may be a myriad of diﬀerent ways in which the bureaucrats can extort
bribes from the private agents. However, for the sake of tractability, I assume that the
bureaucrat extorts 0 bribes with probability, q2 = 1   p2, and bh bribes with probability,
p2, where 0 < bh. This binomial process can be viewed, similar to the case of collusive
corruption, converging to some limiting normal distribution with the following parameters:
x2 = bhp2 (10)
and
2 = p2q2b
2
h: (11)
One also may note that as a distribution of bribe payments becomes more symmetric
(i.e. p2 = q2), the uncertainty caused by this corruption grows. Thus, in the environment
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where corruption is widespread and accepted as a norm, the probability of paying bribes
becomes close to unity. This eliminates uncertainty stemming from noncollusive corrup-
tion, and hence, decreases the negative eﬀect of corruption. It is clear that under such
conditions noncollusive corruption becomes just a type of illegal taxation. In a related
study, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have explained intuitively why centralized corruption
results in lower burden for the private agents than it is under decentralized corruption.
Our discussion complements their results by indicating that under decentralized corruption
the burden of uncertainty is also greater.
Now, we are ready to formulate the impact of noncollusive corruption on private agent’s
income. Quite intuitively, the bribes extorted are positively related to the income level
of the private agent. Thus, similar to the case with taxation, we can write this random
income shock caused by noncollusive corruption as:
dx2 = x2y2dt+ 2ydz2: (12)
Here the ﬁrst term is the deterministic part of the extorted rents and the second term is
its stochastic part.
Based on the above discussions the following proposition is stated.
Proposition 2.1 An increase of the burden of both types of corruption raises income
uncertainty.
Proof From (6), it is veriﬁed that an increase in corruption expressed as an increase in
the bribe rate, b, raises directly . Observing (8), one can establish that this leads to an
increase in the variance, 21.
From (11) it is clear that for any given distribution of outcomes for bribes, and an
increase in the levels of bribe rate, bh, raises uncertainty, measured by 22. 
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2.5 Overall random income process
By incorporating the both random income shocks to the initial income of the agent, we
write the budget equation as:
dk = [(1   + x1e)y   x2y2   c]dt+ 1eydz1   2y2dz2 (13)
where the ﬁrst term is the expected part of this random income, the second term is the
stochastic part, which depends on the success in tax evasion. Incorporating eﬀects of both
types of corruption, disposable income is found as a sum of two stochastic processes: i)
tax evasion, ii) and income extortion by corrupt oﬃcials.
For the ease of notation I introduce:
dv = y1edz1 + y22dz2: (14)
This implies that the variance of the summary shock is given by:
2 = (ye1)
2   2yy2e12 + y2222:
We can assume that there is no correlation between the two income shocks, as taxation
and other red tape related regulations are implemented by diﬀerent bureaucrats. Thus,
12 = 0, and hence, 2 = (ye1)2 + (y22)2. This also allows to write the budget
equation as:
dk = [(1   + x1e)y   x2y2   c]dt+ dv:
Now, we are ready to consider a household’s optimization problem.
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2.6 The household’s optimization
An individual household maximizes its expected overall utility by choosing the consumption
level c, the tax evasion rate e, and the share of capital in the high-productive sector n,
subject to the budget constraint:
max
c;e;n
U =
Z 1
0
ln(c) exp( t)dt; (15)
s:t: dk = [(1   + x1e)y   x2y2   c]dt+ dv; (16)
0  c  (1   + x1e)y   x2y2; 0  k; k(0) = k0; (17)
0  e  1: (18)
This problem is solved by satisfying the following Bellman equation, where I made the
following substitutions y = [A(1  n) +Bn]k and y2 = Bnk:
I(k) = max
c;e;n
fln(c(t)) + I 0(k)([1   + x1e][B(1  n) +Kn]k   x2BnK   c) +
+
1
2
I 00(k)[(A(1  n) +Bn)2k2(1e)2 + 22(Bnk)2]g; (19)
where I(k) = max
c;e
E0
R1
0
ln(c) exp( t)dt	 s.t. (16),(17), (18), is the value function,
E0 is the conditional expectation operator for the given initial value of capital, k(0) = k0.
The FOC of the Bellman equation (19) leads to
c(t) =
1
I 0(k)
; (20)
e(t) =   I
0(k)r
I 00(k)2[A(1  n) +Bn]k ; (21)
n =  I
0(k)[1ek]2A+ kI 0(k)[(1   + x1e)(B   A)  x2]
k2I 00(k)[(1e(B   A)]2 + (2B)2] : (22)
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A general solution of this diﬀerential equation can be expressed in the following form,
I(k) =
ln(k) + C

. A substitution for I(k) in (20),(21),and (22) leads to:
c(t) = k; (23)
e(t) =
x1
21[A(1  n) +Bn]
; (24)
n =
(1   + x1e)(B   A)  x2   [1e ]2A
[(1e(B   A)]2 + (2B)2] : (25)
Since, only consumption is a function of capital, we insert back (21) into (19), and
obtain:
I(k) = ln

1/I 0(k)

+ I 0(k)
h
(1   + x1e) (A(1  n) +Bn)k)  x2Bnk  

1/I 0(k)
i
+
1
2
I 00(k) [(A(1  n) +Bn)2(k1e)2 + (Bnk2)2] =
= ln(k)  1 + (1   + x1)
~A  x2Bn

  (
~A1e)
2 + (Bn2)
2
2 
(26)
Here, for ease of notation we use ~A = A(1   n) + Bn. Now, we can conﬁrm that the
value function has the assumed functional form and given by:
I(k) =
1

"
ln(k)  1 + (1   + x1)
~A  x2Bn

  (
~A1e)
2 + (Bn2)
2
2 
#
: (27)
This conﬁrms that the assumed functional form for the value function is correct.
2.7 Equilibrium Analysis
Productive sector
Using the equilibrium expressions for the evasion rate and the capital share in the high-
productivity sector, we can conduct comparative statics analysis. Taking the ﬁrst-order
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derivatives of the share of the productive sector, n with regards to the measures of both
types of corruption ( the bribe rate b and the mean value of extorted income x2), and the
measures of uncertainty (1 and 2) the following proposition is formulated.
Proposition 2.2 An increase of the burden of both types of corruption, as well as the
uncertainty caused by them decreases share of capital in the high-productivity sector.
Proof One can verify that following results hold:
@n
@b
< 0;
@n
@x2
< 0;
@n
@2
< 0;
@n
@1
< 0: (28)

The indirect eﬀect of uncertainty
The uncertainty caused by corruption not only directly impacts the economy, but also there
is an indirect channel through which it inﬂicts losses to productivity. This conclusion is
based on the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3 Corruption indirectly aﬀects productivity through increase in uncertainty.
Proof Recall from Proposition 2.1 that an increase of the burden of both types of cor-
ruption raises the income uncertainty, therefore, Proposition 2.2 implies that an increase
of the burden of corruption by raising uncertainty has an indirect adverse eﬀect on the
overall productivity through a decrease in the productive sector share, n. 
Since an increase of the burden of corruption decreases the share of the high-productive
sector, overall productivity of the economy diminishes. More generally, we can state that
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the adverse economic eﬀect of corruption is not limited to the income redistribution and
ineﬃciencies in the public sector, but also corruption aﬀects the saving and investment
decisions by increasing the uncertainty related to capital income.
The eﬀect on tax evasion
Our model reveals a quite interesting relationship between productivity (measured as a
share of the productive sector) and tax evasion. This relationship is stated as the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.4 Tax evasion falls with the increase of the high productivity sector size,
n.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that @e
@n
< 0 by diﬀerentiating (25). 
This result gives some explanation why corruption is persistent. It is because that when
the share of the productive sector is low ( that is the country is poor), tax evasion is high
which further decreases productive input to the high productivity sector, thus making it
even less attractive for investment. This also implies that with corrupt bureaucracy tax
evasion is higher, at least because the share of the high-productive sector is lower.
Overall growth eﬀects
Based on (13), we can ﬁnd the per capita growth rate is given as:
 = E

dk
k

= (1  ) (1  n)A+ x
2
1
21
+ (1     x2)Bn   (29)
It can be veriﬁed that an increase of corruption manifested as an increase in the burden
of both types of corruption unambiguously decreases growth rate. This results is stated
as the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.5 An increase of corruption, measured by its burden, unambiguously re-
duces economic growth rate.
Proof Recall that an increase in the bribes rates in collusive corruption, b, decreases the
gain from collusion, x1, and increase the uncertainty related to it, 1. This implies that
@
@n

x1
21

< 0:
Thus, the value of the second term decreases on the RHS in(29). Further, recall that an
increase in noncollusive corruption raises x2, and hence, the contribution of the produc-
tive sector to overall growth diminishes. Moreover, as the results stated above conﬁrm,
an increase in corruption reduces the share of the productive sector, n, and therefore,
production shifts to low-productive sector. For proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms, at the margin
(1  )A  (1     x2)B should hold. Then the following condition holds:
@
@n
= (1  )A  (1     x2)B   abs

@
@n

x1
21

< 0:

3 Conclusions
The model used in the paper allows for a nonlinear impact of corruption on ﬁrms depending
on their productivity, and takes into account income uncertainty caused by interactions
between corrupt bureaucracy and ﬁrms. Importantly, the paper shows that by accounting
for these eﬀects one can avoid the existing theoretical ambiguity about the overall eﬀect of
corruption on growth. Thus, the paper reconciles the theory with the empirical evidence
that states that corruption always has a negative overall eﬀect on economic growth.
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The main results of the paper are as follows. Corruption creates higher entry barriers
into the high-productive sector both through extortion of bribes and the associated increase
in income uncertainty. As the marginal product of capital used in the high-productive
sector depends on the infrastructure and services provided by the public sector. Since,
corruption reduces this public sector productive input through increased tax evasion and
ineﬃciency of the government, with an increase in corruption returns on investment in the
high-productive sector is decreased. This outcome further reduces capital accumulation
in high-productive sector and hinders overall economic growth. The analysis also shows
that an increase in the share of high-productive sector leads to lower tax evasion.
Appendix
A1. Derivation of the variance
We denote the return on tax evasion by x. The variance of the return on tax evasion is
then determined by
var(x) = E[(x)2]  (E[x])2 (30)
where E is the expectation operator. The ﬁrst term is determined as E[(x)2] = p( s)2+
(1  p) 2 =  2[1  p(1  s2)]. Then the variance of this random variable is given by
var(x) = E[(x)2]  (E[x])2 =  2[1  p(1  s2)]  [(1  p(1 + s)) ]2
=  2[1  p(1  s2)]  [1  2p(1 + s) + p2(1 + s)2]
=  2[p  p2](1 + s)2 = p(1  p)()2
(31)
By denoting the variance of the return on tax evasion by 2 and obtain the following:
2 = pq2 2 (32)
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